Sharon Hagenbeek

In the work of Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Fārābī (c.872 – c.950) we can see how the Islamic tradition finds a balance between its Neo-Platonic and Neo-Aristotelian foundations. Al-Fārābī’s system, with its new found status quo between the two, would become the basis for later Islamic thinkers, such as the more broadly known Avicenna and Averroes. As a real systematic thinker, al-Fārābī not only provides his reader with a structured scheme of Arabic Neo-Platonism, he also gives a systematic method: logic – he is the first Islamic logician. Amongst his later readers al-Fārābī would become known as ‘The Second Teacher’ (Aristotle, of course, being the first). However, during his life he probably did not enjoy a lot recognition; it has even been said that in Damascushe made his living as a gardener[1]. In the evenings he would work on his manifold introductions, commentaries and paraphrases, in addition to writing his own original works.

Al-Fārābī’s Metaphysics[2]
Even though al-Fārābī uses the Neo-Platonic scheme of emanation in his metaphysics, he does take into account the Aristotelian ideas of causation and on the Intellect. He defines metaphysics as the science of being and causes. Metaphysics as first philosophy is theology only insofar as its subject, being, is related to the First Principle, the first being and the cause of all cause. As we will see, al-Fārābī uses a negative theology; as far as he is concerned, the human intellect cannot directly know the First Principle.

Both being and intellection have emanated from the First Cause or Principle (the incorporeal First Mover), which itself has no cause or reasons (this also helps al-Fārābī to rid his scheme of an effective or final cause). The First Principle is so perfect that not only its existence has to go on forever, but even more importantly: derivation, the descent down the emanation hierarchy, is negation. The First Cause does not want the world, because to will something is to have a goal; and that would imply reasons for acting.

At first, the First Cause thinks itself, thereby emanating the incorporeal being of the First Intellect. This intellect thinks of itself (creating its sphere of celestial) and of the First Cause, by which multiplicity arises. From this multiplicity in the form of emanation all else follows: the Second Intellect (incorporeal), which thinks up the soul and body; and the Active Intellect, which governs the world of generation and corruption (matter). Al-Fārābī develops a concept of an Active Intellect outside of the human intellect. The Active Intellect is the agent that causes people to think – so potential rationale is turned into actual rationality via this agent.

The incorporeal intellects in this scheme are the Secondary Causes. This all may sound rather unnecessary extensive, but it’s for a good reason: al-Fārābī wants to keep a separation between incorporeal and corporeal being; he wants to keep the distinction between Intellect and Body. Contemplation becomes vital, key for all existence; therefore it will be no surprise that Al-Fārābī is the first Islamic philosopher to declare the rational acquired knowledge of falsafa to be superior to religious revelations.

Knowledge, Ethics and Logic
Al-Fārābī emphasizes the correlation between ethics and knowledge theory. He considers a synthesis of the two necessary for happiness – this idea would be passed along and continues to be upheld in Islam. All humans strive towards knowledge and therefore happiness (ultimate happiness, sa’āda). Thus, his metaphysical theory is employed for his ethical or political thinking, as the basis for the sought after knowledge as a means to happiness as an end.

According to al-Fārābī, the human soul can be divided into several basic faculties. The rational faculty (the rational soul) is of course the highest and survives the death of the body. We are not born with this actual intellect; it must be acquired via falsafa. Reasoning is, as the greatest faculty, not only the domain of happiness, but also that of free will. Al-Fārābī wants the philosopher not only as king, but also as imam.

Although falsafa might be the way to the acquired intellect, this would be impossible without logic as its method. According to al-Fārābī, logic is the tool of scientific research; it keeps our minds from error. Furthermore, he investigates the relationship between logic and language (grammar and definitions), and distinguishes between words and entities. For al-Fārābī, logic is the universal grammar and our only chance of certainty.

See also: Islamic Philosophy