Abu Hāmed Mohammad ibn Mohammad al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), was a Islamic lawyer, a speculative theologian and an Islamic mystic (ṣūfī). To understand the motives of any philosopher, later interpreters often reach out to their autobiographies, as is the case with al-Ghazālī’s Deliverer from Error (al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl). However what is often taken to be his autobiography is by no means undisputedly so. Although Michael E. Mamura[1] makes no mention of the question whether or not the work is in fact meant as an autobiography, Fakhry, a notable authority on Islamic philosophy, calls al-Munqidh “a moving autobiographical work… which has been compared to St. Augustine’s Confessions”[2]. Leezenberg, on the other hand, discredits the guise of an autobiography, considering it to be “an abstract and schematic discussion of four spiritual directions that al-Ghazālī claims to have investigated, namely out of a epistemological point of view, and it follows, with unintended irony, the conventions of the genre of confessions that is popular by al-Ghazālī archenemies, the Ismāʿīlīte”[3]. This may seem an insignificant point, but it turns the reader’s point of view: either al-Ghazālī’s life experiences are the motives behind his philosophy; or the autobiographical elements were used out of philosophical motives. Being aware of this distinction that we prefer to make, will help the reader to better appreciate al-Ghazālī, categorizing him as such does him no justice.
Unlike thinkers such as ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī was a devoted religious man – he even carried the honorary title of ‘Proof of Islam’ (Hujjatul Islam). He practiced Islamic law and theology with philosophical rigor and thereby made important philosophical arguments and contributions to falsafa.
Al-Ghazālī tried to place direct mystical experience (dhawq) above scientific knowledge, as he was convinced it could lead to certainty. This experience does not deny human reason, but it is far beyond our reasoning; in the mystical experience we can find religious truth which we aren’t able to prove, because this truth has to be experienced.
Since even the great thinkers weren’t able to reach a consensus about matters of the truth, their philosophy could not have risen above the status of individual opinions. Al-Ghazālī tried to show that philosophers in general aren’t able to give definitive answers to religious questions, while those thinkers maintain that human reason could reach truth by its own accord. Just as with theologians, we should not just follow them unless we know with absolute certainty that they are right. For al-Ghazālī, most important was to truly think about the inner experience, authenticity, and truth, rather than to uphold appearances – which can be deceiving. Pure rational or doctrinal approaches would not suffice to find theological truths, they would have to be experienced. Unfortunately, al-Ghazālī also holds the opinion that the masses can’t and shouldn’t think for themselves. In this sense, when he said that we need to think for ourselves, he was addressing the mutakallimiin (Islamic theological scholars) only.
Philosophical Ideas
Al-Ghazālī rejected the (Aristotelian) notion of causality: that every effect has a cause, since based solely on our perception, we cannot sustain such a notion. Within a completely contingent world, al-Ghazālī opens up the possibility of miracles. He places this critique on ibn Sīnā, before adopting his ideas anew to match his occasionalistic views that everything is not causally connected but by the will of God. With this he also drops the Neo–Platonic notion of emanation, which had previously been refined by Al-Fārābī; instead, God’s power creates the universe and everything in it. Even our own human acts are directed by God’s power. So according to al-Ghazālī God has not only knowledge of particulars, he also controls them. Furthermore, al-Ghazālī denies the theory of an eternal world and he reaffirms the doctrine of the immortal soul (and with this the idea of the bodily resurrection of Jesus and of an afterlife for the soul).
Al-Ghazālī clearly set out to right the wrongs of his philosophical predecessors, al-Fārābī and ibn Sīnā. He also had different ideas in regards to logic. When he speaks about logic, he does follows ibn Sīnā up to a certain point; he, too, wants an Islamic version of Aristotelian logic with its demonstrative syllogisms. However according to him, logic is a purely formal science, useful for the theory of debating law, not a source of knowledge on the world. Moreover, he also wants to rid logic from ibn Sīnā’s stoic elements and hypothetic syllogisms.
Whilst al-Ghazālī tries to free Kalām of the influences of (Greek) philosophy, since he wants the true theological truths to be experienced, he is simultaneously endorsing the assimilation of Greek logic into Islamic law.